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Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Foucha v. Louisiana,' the United States Supreme Court held
that a state may not confine an insanity acquittee indefinitely in a
mental institution once he has regained his sanity, solely on the ba-
sis of his continuing dangerousness. The Court's opinion, however,
seemed to suggest two contradictory bases for its decision. First,
relying on Jones v. United States,2 the Court appeared to hold that
Foucha was entitled to release once he had regained his sanity, and
any further confinement would be unconstitutional. Later in the
opinion and explicitly in the concurrence, however, the Court's rea-
soning attacked the statute's broadness, implying that a more nar-
rowly tailored scheme for the detention of sane-but-dangerous
insanity acquittees would be acceptable. 3
This Note first reconciles the opinions of the majority and the
concurrence by considering a reading ofJones that is consistent with
both opinions, permitting the continued confinement of acquittees
who have regained their sanity. This Note argues, however, that
neither the language ofJones nor prior caselaw warrants such a read-
ing. Rather, as this Note demonstrates, the broad language ofJones
requires that an acquittee be released once he is no longer insane.
This Note also challenges the Court's holding on equal protection
grounds by comparing dangerous insanity acquittees to other sane-
but-dangerous offenders. Finally, this Note suggests that the
heightened standard of scrutiny created by Justice O'Connor in her
concurrence, while appearing to protect the interests of insanity ac-
* The author wishes to express her gratitude to Professors Ron Allen and Len
Rubinowitz for their guidance and insight. Special thanks also to Karen Taylor and
Dean Papadakis for their willingness to engage in thought-provoking discussions that
contributed greatly to the development of this Note.
1 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992).
2 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
3 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1786-87; Id. at 1789 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
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quittees, does not go far enough; ultimately, her standard will have
little practical impact on their release.
II. BACKGROUND
The civil-criminal dichotomy in insanity commitment occupies
an odd place in our criminal law.4 Underlying the insanity defense
is the idea that the criminal law is designed to punish the "bad" and
not the "mad"; 5 those who are insufficiently blameworthy are thus
exempted from criminal responsibility.6 The commitment and re-
lease proceedings following a verdict of not guilty by reason of in-
sanity (NGRI) are considered neither essentially criminal nor
essentially civil in nature.7 Rather, the legal status of insanity ac-
quittees is reflected by three basic viewpoints:
(1) those who believe insanity acquittees are entitled to treatment and
the opportunity to be rehabilitated in an environment that is no more
restrictive than necessary to protect the public from demonstrated
dangerousness; (2) those who believe that such acquittees should be
treated like criminals; and (3) those who believe that treatment and
rehabilitation should be afforded insane persons, but that the overrid-
ing concern is the safety of the public.8
The modern trend has been toward the second view, focusing
more on the criminal conduct and less on the requisite culpability.
While most notably demonstrated in the creation of the guilty but
mentally ill verdict (GBMI), 9 this tilt toward the criminal law is re-
flected in the Court's decisions as well.
Early on, in Baxstrom v. Herold,10 the Court struck down a New
York statute that permitted the commitment of a convicted criminal
at the end of his sentence without a jury determination of his cur-
rent sanity. Because the Court saw no basis for distinguishing a
4 For the purposes of this Note, "civil commitment" will refer to involuntary com-
mitment in a mental institution. "Criminal commitment" will refer to involuntary com-
mitment following a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.
5 United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cited in Janet Pol-
stein, Throwing Away the Key: Due Process Rights of Insanity Acquittees in Jones v. United
States, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 479 (1985).
6 John Party, The Civil-Criminal Dichotomy in Insanity Commitment and Release Proceedings:
Hinckley and Other Matters, 11 MENTAL & PHYs. DISAB. L. REP. 218 (1987).
7 Id
8 Id
9 The "guilty but mentally ill" verdict is seen as a middle ground between punishing
the insane and releasing those who have committed crimes, by providing treatment of
the defendant's mental illness while ensuring that the defendant will be confined-either
in a mental hospital or in prison-until his sentence expires. For a general discussion of
the GBMI verdict, see Christopher Slobogin, The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict: An Idea
Whose Time Should Not Have Come, 53 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 494 (1985).
10 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
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criminal nearing the end of his sentence from a civil committee, for
whom such a determination was available, the Court held the statute
unconstitutional as a violation of equal protection."
Six years later, in Jackson v. Indiana,12 the Court held that a crim-
inal suspect could be institutionalized only so long as to determine
whether the suspect could become competent to stand trial. If the
suspect was to be held longer, the state had to afford him the proce-
dural safeguards of a civil commitment hearing.' 3 Similarly, in Vitek
v. Jones,14 the Court recognized that a convicted criminal had a lib-
erty interest in not being transferred to a mental institution without
the procedural safeguards of civil commitment. 15
The Court articulated the constitutional standard for civil com-
mitment in Addington v. Texas. 16 The Court held that, at a minimum,
states were required to prove insanity and dangerousness by the
heightened standard of clear and convincing evidence before an in-
dividual could be civilly committed.'
7
While the early cases seemed to indicate that insanity acquittees
were entitled to the same procedural protections as civil commit-
tees, the Court's decision in Jones v. United States '8 took a decidedly
criminal turn. In Jones, the Court permitted the automatic commit-
ment of an insanity acquittee following an NGRI verdict without a de
novo hearing as to insanity.' 9 Contrary to its prior decisions, the
Court held that insanity acquittees are a "special class that should
be treated differently from other candidates for commitment." 20
Thus, the State could now commit an acquittee upon a preponder-
ance of the evidence, rather than meeting the clear and convincing
evidence standard of Addington.
III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Terry Foucha was charged by a bill of information with aggra-
vated burglary and illegal discharge of a firearm. 21 The trial court
appointed two experts in forensic psychiatry, Dr. Kenneth Ritter
and Dr. Ignacio Medina, Jr., to conduct a pretrial examination of
11 Id. at 112-14.
12 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
13 Id. at 738.
14 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
15 Id. at 495.
16 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
17 Id. at 433.
18 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
19 Id. at 366.
20 Id. at 370.
21 State v. Foucha, 563 So. 2d 1138, 1138-39 (La. 1990).
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Foucha.22 Four months after an initial finding that Foucha lacked
the mental capacity to proceed, the trial court found Foucha compe-
tent to stand trial.
23
On October 12, 1984, the trial court found Foucha not guilty by
reason of insanity (NGRI).24 The court found that he:
is unable to appreciate the usual, natural, and probable consequences
of his acts; that he is unable to distinguish right from wrong; that he is
a menace to himself and others; and that he was insane at the time of
the commission of the above crimes and is presently insane.
25
After the NGRI verdict, the trial court held a hearing, pursuant
to Louisiana statute,26 to determine whether Foucha was danger-
ous 27 so as to require continued confinement. The trial court con-
cluded that Foucha was presently dangerous and, pursuant to
Article 654 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure, ordered
him committed to a mental institution.28 Foucha was admitted to
the Feliciana Forensic Facility on April 30, 1985.29
In early 1988, the superintendent of Feliciana recommended
Foucha's discharge or release, pursuant to Article 655.30 A review
22 Id at 1139.
23 Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1782 (1992).
24 Ij
25 Iaj
26 Article 654 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure provides:
When a defendant is found not guilty by reason of insanity in any [noncapital] fel-
ony case, the court shall remand him to the parish jail or to a private mental institu-
tion approved by the court and shall promptly hold a contradictory hearing at which
the defendant shall have the burden of proof, to determine whether the defendant
can be discharged or can be released on probation, without danger to others or to
himself. If the court determines that the defendant cannot be released without dan-
ger to others or to himself, it shall order him committed to a proper state mental
institution or to a private mental institution approved by the court for custody, care,
and treatment. If the court determines that the defendant can be discharged or
released on probation without danger to others or to himself, the court shall either
order his discharge, or order his release on probation subject to specified condi-
tions for a fixed or an indeterminate period. The court shall assign written findings
of fact and conclusions of law; however, the assignment of reasons shall not delay
the implementation ofjudgment.
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 654 (West Supp. 1991).
27 "Dangerous to others" means the condition of a person whose behavior or signifi-
cant threats support a reasonable expectation that there is a substantial risk that he will
inflict physical harm upon another person in the near future. LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 28:2(3) (West 1986).
"Dangerous to self" means the condition of a person whose behavior, significant
threats, or inaction support a reasonable expectation that there is a substantial risk that
he will inflict physical or sever emotional harm upon his own person. LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 28:2(4) (West 1986).
28 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1782. See also supra note 26.
29 State v. Foucha, 563 So. 2d 1138, 1139 (La. 1990).




panel of three doctors convened to evaluate Foucha's current condi-
tion and determine whether he could be released or placed on pro-
bation without danger to others or to himself.31 The panel issued a
report on March 21, 1988, unanimously recommending Foucha's
conditional release.32 The panel also reported no evidence of
mental illness since admission.33
After considering the panel's report, the trial judge convened a
sanity commission pursuant to Article 657.34 The commission was
comprised of Drs. Ritter and Medina, the two doctors who had con-
ducted Foucha's pretrial examination. At a hearing on November
29, 1988, Dr. Ritter testified that there was no evidence that Foucha
currently suffered from any psychosis or neurosis.3 5 He also testi-
fied that upon commitment Foucha probably suffered from a drug-
induced psychosis but had recovered from that temporary condition
and that currently he was in "good shape" mentally.36
When the superintendent of a mental institution is of the opinion that a person
committed pursuant to Article 654 can be discharged or can be released on proba-
tion, without danger to others or to himself, he shall recommend the discharge or
release of the person in a report to a review panel comprised of the person's treat-
ing physician, the clinical director of the facility to which the person is committed,
and a physician or psychologist who served on the sanity commission which recom-
mended commitment of the person .... The panel shall review all reports promptly.
After review, the panel shall make a recommendation to the court by which the
person was committed as to the person's mental condition and whether he can be
discharged, conditionally or unconditionally, or placed on probation, without being
a danger to others or to himself. If the review panel recommends to the court that
the person be discharged, conditionally or unconditionally, or placed on probation,
the court shall conduct a contradictory hearing following notice to the district
attorney.
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 655(A) (West Supp. 1991).
31 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1782.
32 Id. As part of Foucha's conditional release, the panel recommended that he (1) be
placed on probation; (2) remain free from intoxicating and mind-altering substances; (3)
attend a substance abuse clinic on a regular basis; (4) submit to regular and random
urine drug screening; and (5) be actively employed or seeking employment. I&. at 1782
n.2.
33 Id.
34 Id. Article 657 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure provides:
After considering the report or reports filed... the court may either continue the
commitment or hold a contradictory hearing to determine whether the committed
person can be discharged, or can be released on probation, without danger to
others or to himself. At the hearing the burden shall be upon the committed person
to prove that he can be discharged, or can be released on probation, without danger
to others or to himself. After the hearing, and upon filing written findings of fact
and conclusions of law, the court may order the committed person discharged, re-
leased on probation subject to specified conditions for a fixed or an indeterminate
period, or recommitted to the state mental institution.
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 657 (West Supp. 1991).
35 Brief for the Petitioner at 6, Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992) (No. 90-
5844) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner]. It was stipulated that Dr. Medina's testimony
would be essentially the same. Id.
36 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1782.
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However, Dr. Ritter stated that Foucha had an antisocial per-
sonality, a condition that is not a mental disease and not treatable.
3 7
Furthermore, the doctor testified that Foucha had been involved in
several altercations with other patients at Feliciana, and that, as his
doctor, he would not "feel comfortable in certifying that [Foucha]
would not be a danger to himself or to other people."38 Rejecting
the panel's recommendation for Foucha's release, the trial court
found that Foucha posed a danger to himself and others, and or-
dered him recommitted to Feliciana.3 9
The Louisiana Court of Appeals denied Foucha's application
for supervisory writs by a 2-1 vote, based upon Dr. Ritter's refusal to
certify that Foucha would not be dangerous to himself or others.40
The Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed, holding that Foucha had
not carried the statutory burden of proving that he was not danger-
ous.4 ' Moreover, the court held that the "dangerousness test" for
the continued detention of insanity acquittees in Article 657 did not
violate either the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.42 The Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari on the question of whether the State could predicate
Foucha's continued confinement in a mental facility solely on his
continuing dangerousness. 43
IV. THE SUPREME COURT OPINION
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, reversed the decision of
the Louisiana Supreme Court, holding that Article 657, which au-
thorized Foucha's confinement on the basis of his continuing dan-
gerousness, was unconstitutional. The majority held that a statute
that provided for the indefinite commitment of insanity acquittees in
a mental institution on the basis of dangerousness, without regard
to the acquittee's current sanity, violated both the Equal Protection
and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
44
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Writing for the majority, Justice White45 announced the stan-
37 Id.
38 Id. at 1782-83.
39 Id. at 1783.
40 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 35, at 7.
41 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1783.
42 Id.
43 Foucha v. Louisiana, 111 S. Ct. 1412 (1991).
44 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1784.
45 Id. at 1783. Justice White was joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter;
Justice O'Connor joined Part II of the Court's opinion.
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dard for civil commitment as established in Addington v. Texas.46 In
Addington, the Court held that a State must prove by clear and con-
vincing evidence that a person sought to be civilly committed is
mentally ill and that he requires hospitalization for his own welfare
and the protection of others. 47 Justice White recognized, however,
that in the criminal context, a state may commit an individual with-
out meeting the rigorous "clear and convincing evidence" standard
of Addington.48 Relying on the Court's decision in Jones v. United
States,49 Justice White stated that an NGRI verdict is sufficient to
permit the inference that, at the time of the verdict, the defendant is
still mentally ill and dangerous. Because insanity is an affirmative
defense proven only by a preponderance of the evidence, the Court
thus permitted a lower standard of proof for initial commitment in
the NGRI context. 50
Justice White emphasized, however, that under Jones, an in-
sanity acquittee is "entitled to release when he has recovered his
sanity or is no longer dangerous." 5 1 The Court citedJones' reliance
on O'Connor v. Donaldson,52 a civil case which held that the continued
confinement of a mentally ill person who was not dangerous was a
violation of due process, since the basis for the person's confine-
ment no longer existed. 53 Analogously, since Foucha was not cur-
rently mentally ill, the basis for holding him as an insanity acquittee
in a psychiatric facility had likewise disappeared.54
1. Due Process
The Court rejected the argument that the State could confine
Foucha in a mental institution on the basis of his dangerousness
alone. First, Justice White recognized that due process requires that
the nature of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the pur-
pose for which the individual is committed. 55 Because the purpose
of Foucha's confinement was the treatment of his mental illness, it
would be unconstitutional to confine Foucha in a mental institution
46 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
47 Id.
48 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1783.
49 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
50 Id.
51 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1784 (citingJones, 463 U.S. at 368).
52 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
53 Id. at 576. Thus, if Foucha had been proven mentally ill but not dangerous, he
would be entitled to release under O'Connor.
54 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1784.
55 Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983).
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once his illness had disappeared. 56 Second, if Foucha were to be
confined at all, he would be entitled to constitutionally adequate
procedures (i.e., those afforded in a civil commitment hearing) to
establish the grounds for his confinement.5 7 Third, Justice White
held that the fundamental right to liberty requires that commitment
for any purpose also meets the requirements of substantive due pro-
cess. 58 The Court cited examples of confinement that meets the re-
quirements of due process: the imprisonment of convicted criminals
for the purposes of deterrence and retribution; the civil commit-
ment of mentally ill and dangerous individuals, upon proof by clear
and convincing evidence; and, in narrow circumstances, the limited
detention of dangerous individuals prior to trial.59
The Court acknowledged that under Louisiana law, a person
found not guilty by reason of insanity was exempt from criminal re-
sponsibility by reason of his acquittal.60 Since the State had no pu-
nitive interest, therefore, it could not confine Foucha in prison for
the purposes of deterrence or retribution.6 ' Second, because
Foucha was not currently insane, the State could not justify his con-
finement on the basis of his mental illness, as in the civil context.62
The State argued, however, that Foucha's continued confine-
ment was justified by his continuing dangerousness and the societal
interest in preventive detention. The State analogized from the
Court's decision in United States v. Salerno,63 which held that the Bail
Reform Act's pretrial detention of dangerous individuals did not vi-
olate due process.64 Because the Bail Reform Act permitted the de-
tention of dangerous people who had not been convicted, the State
argued that the continued confinement of insanity acquittees should
56 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1785.
57 Id. (citing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972)). See also Baxstrom v. Herold,
383 U.S. 107 (1966).
58 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1785 (citingJones, 463 U.S. at 361).
59 Id. at 1785-86.
60 Id. at 1785. The statute provides:
"If the circumstances indicate that because of a mental disease or mental defect the
offender was incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong with reference to the
conduct in question, the offender shall be exempt from criminal responsibility." LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:14 (West 1986).
61 Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1785 (1992) (citingJones, 463 U.S. at 369).
62 Id. at 1786.
63 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
64 The Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3156 (1985), provides for the
detention prior to trial of arrestees charged with certain serious felonies if the govern-
ment demonstrates by dear and convincing evidence after an adversary hearing that no
release conditions "will reasonably assure . . . the safety of any other person and the
community." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (1985).
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similarly be permitted. 65
The Foucha Court, however, rejected the State's argument. Jus-
tice White emphasized that the Bail Reform Act carefully limited the
circumstances under which the government could seek detention,66
and was narrowly focused on a particularly acute problem involving
overwhelming government interests. 67 Furthermore, the Bail Re-
form Act required the government, not the defendant, to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that no conditions of release would
reasonably assure the safety of the community; even so, the duration
of the confinement was strictly limited.68
By contrast, the Louisiana statute in Foucha placed the burden
on the detainee, and not the State, to prove that he would not be
dangerous. 69 In addition, Article 657 permitted Foucha's indefinite
commitment based upon predictions of his future dangerousness,
rather than setting an outside limit on the length of his confine-
ment.70 Because the Louisiana scheme of confinement was not as
narrowly focused as the Bail Reform Act, the Court held that it did
not fall under one of the "carefully limited exceptions permitted by
the Due Process Clause. '" 7'
2. Equal Protection
Justice White72 also held that Article 657 violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.73 While acknowl-
edgingJones' holding that the government may treat insanity acquit-
tees differently from civil committees, the Court stated that, since
Foucha was not presently insane, the State could no longer classify
him as an insanity acquittee. 74 Instead, the Court required the gov-
ernment to treat Foucha equally with others who have been found
beyond a reasonable doubt to have committed criminal acts-that is,
to release him regardless of his future dangerousness. 75 Because
65 Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1786 (1992).
66 Id. Pretrial detention can only be sought in cases involving crimes of violence,
offenses punishable by life imprisonment or death, serious drug offenses, or certain re-
peat offenders. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747.
67 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1786.
68 Id. An arrestee is entitled to a prompt detention hearing, and the maximum
length of detention is limited by the stringent time limits of the Speedy Trial Act. Id.
69 Id. For the relevant language from Article 657 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal
Procedure, see supra note 34.
70 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1787.
71 Id.
72 Justice White was joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter.
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Louisiana did not allow for the continued confinement of convicted
criminals based on dangerousness alone, it had thus impermissibly
discriminated against insanity acquittees who have regained their
sanity.7
6
Justice White stated further that in both civil commitment pro-
ceedings and in confining an insane convict beyond his criminal sen-
tence, the State is required to prove insanity and dangerousness by
clear and convincing evidence. 7 In the instant case, however,
Foucha had the burden of proving that he would not be danger-
ous. 7 8 Because the State failed to justify the denial of these proce-
dural safeguards against unwarranted confinement to sane
acquittees, Justice White reasoned, Louisiana had violated equal
protection.79
B. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S CONCURRENCE
Justice O'Connor, while agreeing with the majority's due pro-
cess analysis, wrote separately to emphasize the narrowness of the
Court's due process holding.80 Justice O'Connor stressed that the
Court's opinion addressed only Louisiana's broad statutory scheme
permitting indefinite confinement of insanity acquittees in mental
hospitals aifter they have regained their sanity. The Court did not,
in her view, prevent states from ever confining dangerous insanity
acquittees after they regain their mental health.8 1 Nor did the Court
pass judgment on more narrowly drawn laws which permit the con-
finement of sane acquittees, or on the states' power to punish those
people who commit crimes while mentally ill.82
Justice O'Connor recognized that although acquittees may not
be incarcerated as criminals or punished for asserting the insanity
defense, their prior criminal conduct sets them apart from ordinary
citizens.83 Given the uncertainty of medical diagnoses regarding
mental illness, courts are required to pay "particular deference to
reasonable legislative judgments about the relationship between
dangerous behavior and mental illness." 8 4 In the instant case, Loui-





80 Id at 1789 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
81 Id (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
82 Id (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
83 Id (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
84 Id (O'Connor,J., concurring in part and concurring in thejudgment) (citingJones
v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 365 n.13 (1983)).
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from a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity continues even af-
ter the acquittee has regained his sanity.8 5 Having made such a de-
termination, the State may thus continue to confine a sane insanity
acquittee if, as Justice O'Connor stated, "the nature and duration of
detention were tailored to reflect pressing public safety concerns re-
lated to the acquittee's continuing dangerousness. "86
Justice O'Connor proceeded to articulate certain guidelines for
such a scheme. First, she said that a state may not confine an acquit-
tee in a mental hospital without some medical justification for doing
so; otherwise, there would not be the necessary connection between
the nature and purposes of confinement mandated by due pro-
cess.8 7 Next, Justice O'Connor required that a state consider the
particular crime of the acquittee in weighing the acquittee's liberty
interest against the State's interest in preventive detention.88 Fi-
nally, though not formally joining the Court's equal protection anal-
ysis, Justice O'Connor indicated her skepticism that a sane insanity
acquittee could be held longer than a person convicted of the same
crimes could be imprisoned.
8 9
Justice O'Connor concluded by emphasizing that the Court was
placing no new restrictions on the States' freedom to determine
whether and to what extent mental illness should excuse criminal
behavior.9 0
C. JUSTICE KENNEDY'S DISSENT
Justice Kennedy9 1 criticized the majority for its failure to recog-
nize the criminal nature of the case.9 2 Unlike civil proceedings, the
issue of insanity in the criminal context can only be reached after the
State has proven all of the elements of the crime beyond a reason-
85 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
86 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice
O'Connor cited the statutory schemes in New Jersey, Washington, and Wisconsin as
examples of "tailored" statutes that she would find acceptable. See N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2C:4-8(b)(3) (West 1982), 30:4-24.2 (West 1981); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 10.77-020(3),
10.77.110(1) (1990); Wis. STAT. §§ 971.17(1), (3)(c) (Supp. 1991). These statutes, un-
like the one in Foucha, limit the maximum duration of criminal commitment to reflect the
acquittee's crime and hold the acquittees in facilities appropriate to their mental condi-
tion. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1790 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
87 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1789-90 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment). See also Vitek v.Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491-94 (1980).
88 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1789-90 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
89 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
90 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
91 Justice Kennedy was joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist.
92 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1791 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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able doubt, as required by In re Winship.93 Once a state has met that
burden, it may incarcerate on any reasonable basis, without meeting
the heightened requirements of due process. 94
Justice Kennedy accused the majority of conflating the stan-
dards for civil and criminal commitment by ignoring the fact that the
State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Foucha had com-
mitted a crime.95 CitingJones, Justice Kennedy stressed the distinc-
tion between civil and criminal confinement, reiterating the Court's
refusal to extend the protection of proof by clear and convincing
evidence to the criminal context. 96 Instead, the Court in Jones held
that due process permits automatic incarceration after a criminal ad-
judication without further process.
97
Justice Kennedy also argued that the majority failed to recog-
nize the differences between clinical insanity and criminal insanity,
which is defined by state law.98 In civil proceedings, the State uses
its parens patriae power 99 to provide for and protect society from in-
dividuals suffering from mental illness, basing its decision on medi-
cal predictions about the committee's dangerous conduct in the
future. 100 By contrast, Foucha's commitment was based on his past
criminal conduct, resulting from a legal determination that Foucha
could not have distinguished right from wrong at the time of his
offense. 10 1 Thus, Justice Kennedy concluded, a finding of present
sanity was irrelevant to Foucha's release.' 0 2
Justice Kennedy further argued that the State, while choosing
not to punish insanity acquittees, still retained its interest in in-
capacitative incarceration.10 3 Because incapacitation is a reasonable
basis for confinement, and because the State had proven all of the
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, the State could
therefore continue to confine insanity acquittees on the basis of dan-
93 Id. at 1791 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)).
94 Id. at 1792 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
95 l at 1793 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
96 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 366
(1983)).
97 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citingJnes, 463 U.S. at 366).
98 Id. at 1794 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
99 Parens patriae "refers traditionally to the role of state as sovereign and guardian of
persons under legal disability, such as juveniles or the insane... It is the principle that
the state must care for those who cannot take care of themselves .... BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 769 (6th ed. 1991).
100 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1794 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Addington v. Texas,
441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979)).
101 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
102 I&: (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
103 Id. at 1795 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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gerousness, regardless of their current sanity.10 4
As a final point, Justice Kennedy argued that the nature of
Foucha's confinement-in a mental hospital, as opposed to else-
where-did not violate due process.' 0 5 Indeed, he stated that the
facts and conditions of Foucha's confinement in a psychiatric facility
are attributable to his criminal conduct and his own decision to raise
insanity as an affirmative defense, and not to an involuntary commit-
ment proceeding initiated by the State.' 0
6
D. JUSTICE THOMAS' DISSENT
Justice Thomas10 7 strongly criticized the majority for invalidat-
ing what was, in his opinion, a "quite reasonable" statutory
scheme. 108 He began his dissent by questioning the grounds on
which the majority found the scheme unconstitutional. Justice
Thomas questioned first whether the statute was invalid because it
provided for the continued confinement of sane insanity acquittees
at all; or whether, as suggested by Justice O'Connor, the constitu-
tional flaw with the statute was that it provided for their indefinite
confinement in a mental facility. 10 9
Justice Thomas characterized the majority's procedural due
process analysis as being, in reality, an equal protection argument,
since the majority argued that Foucha, upon regaining his sanity,
was entitled to the same treatment as a civil committee. 11 0 Nonethe-
less, Justice Thomas rejected the argument entirely, stating that
there is a "real and legitimate distinction" between insanity acquit-
tees and civil committees that justifies the procedural differences:
that the acquittee has been found, beyond a reasonable doubt, to
have committed a criminal act.II
Justice Thomas stated that the State's interest in treating in-
sanity acquittees differently from civil committees does not disap-
pear upon proof of the acquittee's current sanity. 112 First, the
uncertainty of diagnosis in psychiatry1 13 requires the Court to defer
104 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
105 Id. at 1796 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
106 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
107 Justice Thomas was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia.
108 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1797 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
109 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
110 Id. at 1800 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
111 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
112 Id. at 1801 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
113 The Jones Court noted that "[t]he only certain thing that can be said about the
present state of knowledge and therapy regarding mental disease is that science has not
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as to the reasonable legislative judgments of the states. 114 In addi-
tion, the prior antisocial conduct of an insanity acquittee justifies
treating him differently from a civil committee for purposes of de-
ciding whether he should be released, as the distinction between
civil committees and insanity acquittees turns on the fact that the
latter have "already unhappily manifested the reality of antisocial
conduct." 115 Finally, since a state need not provide an insanity de-
fense at all, it is entitled to attach certain consequences to that de-
fense to prevent its abuse.
116
Justice Thomas emphasized the reasonableness of Louisiana's
legislative judgment in this case by citing eleven state statutes,' 17 as
well as the Model Penal Code, 118 that provide for the continued
confinement of insanity acquittees as long as they remain danger-
ous, regardless of their current sanity.
Justice Thomas also criticized the Court's argument that
Foucha's continued confinement in a mental institution was im-
proper, absent civil proceedings determining current mental illness
and dangerousness. 1 9 He first criticized this argument as illogical,
since Foucha was not insane and could not be confined on grounds
of mental illness even under civil proceedings.' 20 Second, he at-
reached finality of judgment .... 463 U.S. 354, 365 n.13 (1983) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (citing Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 375 (1956)).
114 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1801 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
115 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Dixon v. Jacobs, 427 F.2d 589, 604 (D.C. App.
1970) (Leventhal, J., concurring)).
116 Id. (Thomas,J., dissenting) (citing Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 715 (1962))
("Congress might have considered it appropriate to provide compulsory commitment
for those who successfully invoke an insanity defense in order to discourage false pleas
of insanity.").
117 Id. at 1802-03 n.9 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas cited the following
statutes: CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1026.2(e) (West Supp. 1992); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 403(b) (1987); HAw. REV. STAT. § 704-415 (1985); IowA RULE CRIM. PROC. 21.8(e);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3428(3) (Supp. 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-301(3) (1991);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-9 (West 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-268.1(i) (Supp. 1991);
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-181(3) (Michie 1990); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.200(2) (1990);
Wis. STAT. § 971.17(4) (Supp. 1991).
118 The Model Penal Code provides, in relevant part:
If the Court is satisfied by the report filed pursuant to Subsection (2) of this Section
and such testimony of the reporting psychiatrists as the Court deems necessary that
the committed person may be discharged or released on condition without danger
to himself or others, the Court shall order his discharge or his release on such con-
ditions as the Court determines to be necessary. If the Court is not so satisfied, it
shall promptly order a hearing to determine whether such person may safely be
discharged or released. Any such hearing shall be deemed a civil proceeding and
the burden shall be upon the committed person to prove that he may safely be
discharged or released.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.08(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
119 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1803 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
120 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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tacked the majority's reliance on Vitek v. Jones. 12 1 Since the concern
in Vitek was the stigmatization of the patient, and sinceJones estab-
lished that an insanity acquittal was necessarily a stigma in itself,122
the Court's reliance on Vitek was misplaced. 123
According to Justice Thomas, the Louisiana statutory scheme
did not violate procedural due process because it provided for regu-
lar opportunities for the acquittee to demonstrate that he is no
longer dangerous.' 24 Further, the statute provided for judicial re-
view of such determinations; and, throughout the proceedings,
Foucha was provided with state-appointed counsel.125 These proce-
dures were sufficient, in the dissent's view, to meet the requirements
of procedural due process.
Justice Thomas' analysis then turned to whether Louisiana's
statutory scheme violated Foucha's substantive due process rights.
Justice Thomas began by outlining the traditional analytical frame-
work for evaluating substantive due process claims: if the claim in-
volves a fundamental right, 126 then the legislation will be subject to
strict scrutiny. A state law that abridges a fundamental right, then,
will be upheld only upon a showing that the law is necessary to ef-
fect a compelling state interest.' 27 If a fundamental right is not in-
volved, however, judicial review of state legislation will not be
exacting. 128 Justice Thomas criticized the majority for ignoring the
framework by first failing to articulate what, if any, fundamental
right is at stake; and second, by failing to disclose the applicable
standard of review.' 2
9
Justice Thomas wrote that the majority first contradicted itself
121 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
122 Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 367 (1983).
123 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1803 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
124 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) For a detailed explanation of the release procedures,
see LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 654, 655 and 657 (West Supp. 1991). See also supra
notes 26, 30, 34.
125 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1803 (Thomas,J., dissenting).
126 In determining whether a fundamental right exists, courts must look to the "tradi-
tions and [collective] conscience of our people" to determine whether a principle is "so
rooted [there] as to be ranked as fundamental." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
487 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
127 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1804 (Thomas, J., dissenting). For examples of the Court's
application of strict scrutiny analysis of fundamental rights, see Griswold, 381 U.S. 479
(contraception); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374 (1978) (marriage); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)
(family living arrangements).
128 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1804 (Thomas,J., dissenting) (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186, 191-96 (1986)). See also Michael H. & Victoria D. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110
(1989).
129 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1804 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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by seemingly arguing for two different rights-the right to be free
from bodily restraint (i.e., that Foucha is confined at all after regain-
ing his sanity); or, as pointed out by Justice O'Connor, the right to
be free from indefinite confinement in a mental facility.130 In regard
to the former, Justice Thomas argued that, since it is obvious that
such a right does not apply to all people at all times (convicted pris-
oners, for example), the question must be "whether insanity acquittees
have a fundamental right to freedom from bodily restraint," which
would trigger the strict scrutiny standard.' 3 ' Given the deferential
review of state statutes involving the involuntary confinement of the
mentally ill, and the "reasonable relation" requirement articulated
in Jackson v. Indiana,13 2 Justice Thomas argued that it is clear that no
fundamental right exists, and that heightened judicial scrutiny was
not warranted. 133
Justice Thomas then addressed the question of whether the
statute's unconstitutionality rested on its indefinite commitment of
insanity acquittees in a mental institution. He argued that the "in-
definite" label is misleading because, as in Jones, the patient is con-
fined only as long as he cannot satisfy the substantive standards for
release, regardless of whether or not the statutory maximum sen-
tence for a criminal conviction has been exceeded. 13 4 Furthermore,
since Foucha had only been confined for eight years, twenty-four
years shorter that the maximum sentence had he been convicted,
Justice Thomas considered the majority's concerns about indefinite
commitment speculative at best.'35
As a final point, Justice Thomas argued that nothing in the Due
Process Clause per se prohibits continued confinement of a sane in-
sanity acquittee in a mental institution. 13 6 Because many states have
long provided for the continued detention of dangerous but sane
insanity acquittees, and because the Court did not present any evi-
dence that such persons were traditionally transferred out of mental
institutions to other detention facilities, Justice Thomas asserted
that no basis existed to recognize the fundamental right of a sane
insanity acquittee to be transferred to another facility.' 3 7
130 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
131 Id- at 1806 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).
132 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
133 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1807 n.15. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
134 Id. at 1808 (Thomas, J, dissenting).
135 Id (Thomas, J., dissenting).
136 Id. at 1808-09 (Thomas, J., dissenting).




The danger of the Foucha opinion lies in the ambiguity of its
holding. Initially, the Court appears to make the broad statement
that a state is required to release an insanity acquittee once he has
regained his sanity. The Court emphasizes repeatedly that an in-
sanity acquittee "may be held as long as he is both mentally ill and
dangerous, but no longer."'138 Later in the opinion and in the con-
currence, however, the Court recoils from its original position. In-
stead, the majority seems to suggest (Justice O'Connor doing so
explicitly) that the statute's constitutional flaw is not that it requires
the acquittee's confinement at all, but rather that it provides for the
indefinite confinement of a sane insanity acquittee in a mental facil-
ity. 139 Thus, a narrower scheme for the preventive detention of
dangerous acquittees could pass constitutional muster.' 40 In order
to analyze the Court's decision, this apparent contradiction must be
understood and, if possible, resolved.
Had the Court wanted to make a sweeping, unequivocal state-
ment requiring the release of all sane insanity acquittees regardless
of dangerousness, it could have done so explicitly. Such a state-
ment, however, could very likely have generated the kind of back-
lash that resulted from John Hinckley's insanity acquittal for the
attempted assassination of President Reagan in 1981.'41 State legis-
lators who sensed that the Court had widened the insanity "loop-
hole" would move to tighten control over the defense. States might
narrow the application of the insanity defense by requiring proof of
insanity beyond a reasonable doubt, by substituting a verdict of
guilty but mentally i11142 for the insanity acquittal, or by abolishing
the insanity defense altogether. 143 Public fear and concern over the
premature release of insanity acquittees could thus turn the impact
138 Id. at 1784 (emphasis added).
139 Id. at 1786. See also id. at 1789 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
140 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1786.
141 Ajury found Hinckley not guilty by reason of insanity on 13 charges, ranging from
attempted assassination of the President to possession of an unlicensed pistol, arising
from the shooting of President Reagan and three other men on March 30, 1981. See
N.Y. TiMEs, June 22, 1982, at A1, cited in Peter Margulies, The "Pandemonium Between the
Mad and the Bad:" Procedures for the Commitment and Release of Insanity Acquittees AfterJones v.
United States, 36 RUTGERS L. REv. 793 n.1 (1984) (hereinafter "Margulies"). In a poll
conducted by the New York Times after the Hinckley verdict, 757o of the respondents
said they did not favor exculpation for criminal acts based on insanity. See N.Y. TIMES,
June 13, 1982, at B6, cited in Margulies at 794 n.3.
142 See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 6-2(c) (1989).
143 See IDAHO CODE § 18-207(a) (1987) (mental condition not a defense to criminal
charges).
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of a decision favoring the liberty interests of the acquittee into an
abandonment of the insanity defense.
144
Perhaps more significantly, an opinion requiring the release of
insanity acquittees who have regained their mental health would not
have commanded a majority of the Court. Justice O'Connor, the
fifth vote in the majority opinion, would still have concurred in the
judgment that the Louisiana statute is overbroad and unconstitu-
tional. As is reflected in her concurrence in Foucha, however, Justice
O'Connor does not view due process as preventing a state from ever
confining an acquittee on the basis of dangerousness. Like the dis-
senters, Justice O'Connor would permit continued confinement, al-
beit in narrower circumstances than Justices Kennedy or Thomas
would suggest. In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor cited the cur-
rent schemes in New Jersey, Washington, and Wisconsin, which
limit the length of confinement and hold acquittees in facilities ap-
propriate to their mental condition, as examples of the sort of tai-
lored statutes that would survive her due process scrutiny.145 Thus,
although the decision of Foucha would be the same-the invalidation
of the Louisiana statute-the opinion would stand for little more
than evidence of a deeply fragmented Court, with unclear implica-
tions for future lower court decisions.
Justice White's statement, however, was not so bold. The nar-
rowness of the "carefully limited exception" of the Bail Reform Act
and the Court's discussion of Salerno 146 would have been irrelevant
if an acquittee were simply entitled to release upon regaining his
sanity. Furthermore, the fact that Justice O'Connor joined in the
Court's due process analysis rather than simply concurring in the
judgment indicates that the Court did not take away the state's
power to confine sane insanity acquittees altogether, despite Justice
Kennedy's assertion to the contrary. Thus, the real question of
Foucha is not whether a state may continue to confine insanity acquit-
tees on the basis of dangerousness, but how it may go about doing
SO.
144 For a broader discussion of the "hidden cost" of the Foucha decision, see Paul
Robinson, Dangerous Blameless Offenders and the Criminal-Civil Distinction, 83 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY XX (1993).
145 Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1790 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (cit-
ing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:4-8(b)(3) (West 1982), 30:4-24.2 (West 1981); WASH. REv.
CODE §§ 10.77.020(3), 10.77.110(1) (1990); Wis. STAT. §§ 971.17(1),(3)(c) (Supp.
1991)).
146 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1786-87.
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A. THE PARADOXICAL HOLDING AND THE PRECEDENT OF JONES
The flaw with the Court's analysis is reflected in its contradic-
tory reasoning-and particularly in its reliance on the landmark case
ofJones v. United States.147 In Jones, an insanity acquittee argued that
his indefinite confinement violated the Due Process Clause because
the proof of his insanity was based only on a preponderance of the
evidence instead of the civil commitment standard of clear and con-
vincing evidence.148 The acquittee argued further that the Constitu-
tion prohibited the hospitalization of an insanity acquittee for a
period longer than he might have served in prison had he been
convicted.1
49
The Jones Court, however, rejected both arguments. First, the
Court addressed the "important differences" between potential civil
committees and insanity acquittees. The concern in the civil con-
text, as articulated in Addington v. Texas, 150 was that members of the
public could be confined on the basis of "some abnormal behavior
which might be perceived by some as symptomatic of a mental or
emotional disorder, but which is in fact within a range of conduct
that is generally acceptable." 51 Because the possible injury to the
individual would be significantly greater than any possible harm to
the State, the Addington Court refused to require the individual to
bear equally the risk of an erroneous decision. 152 Instead, the Court
placed the heightened burden of clear and convincing evidence on
the State.15
3
In the criminal context, however, it is the acquittee himself who
raises insanity as an affirmative defense, thus lessening the concern
as to the risk of error. 154 Furthermore, the Jones Court emphasized
that proof that an acquittee committed a criminal act as a result of
mental illness eliminates the risk that he is being committed for
mere "idiosyncratic behavior."' 155 The Court concluded, therefore,
that there is no reason to adopt the same standard of proof in both
civil and criminal cases.
156
The Jones Court also rejected the suggestion that the length of
an acquittee's hospitalization should be capped by his "hypothetical
147 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
148 Id. at 366-67.
149 Id. at 356.
150 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
151 Id. at 426-27.
152 Id. at 427.
153 Id.
154 Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 367 (1983).
155 Id. (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979)).
156 Id.
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criminal sentence" (i.e., the length of time the defendant would
have been imprisoned had he been convicted for the offense). The
purpose of confinement following an insanity acquittal is the treat-
ment of the individual's mental illness and the protection of both
the individual and society from his potential dangerousness. 157 Be-
cause an acquittee's confinement rests on his continuing illness and
dangerousness, the length of the acquittee's hypothetical criminal
sentence is irrelevant to the purposes of his commitment. 158
Rather, theJones Court held that an insanity acquittee may be con-
fined to a mental institution until he has recovered his sanity or is no
longer dangerous. 59
The majority in Foucha used this language to require Foucha's
release as a matter of due process. Since Foucha was no longer in-
sane, the State was required to release him from the institution. 160
Justice Thomas, however, emphasized thatJones addressed only the
length of an acquittee's confinement as compared to his hypotheti-
cal criminal sentence, not the circumstances under which an acquit-
tee is to be released. 161 His dissent also attacked the majority and
the concurrence for their interpretation of Jones' "holding" that an
acquittee must be released once he is no longer insane. Justice
Thomas wrote that "[e]ither it is true that, as a matter of substantive
due process, an insanity acquittee is entitled to release when he has
recovered his sanity, or it is not. The Court apparently cannot make
up its mind."'16
2
Only a narrow reading of Jones can resolve this conflict. The
Jones Court did not address the issue of whether detention in an-
other facility (i.e., a halfway house for insanity acquittees) would be
permissible in cases where an acquittee remained dangerous after
regaining his sanity; rather, the Court simply stated that the acquit-
tee would be entitled to release from the mental institution. In or-
der for the Foucha Court's analysis to be consistent with precedent,
therefore, its reading of Jones must not prohibit an acquittee's con-
finement in another facility on the basis of dangerousness.
The text of the majority opinion reflects this narrow reading of
Jones. AlthoughJustice Thomas, as quoted above, viewed the major-
ity's use ofJones to support Foucha's release as a matter of substan-
tive due process, the context of the argument demonstrates that it
157 Id. at 368.
158 Id. at 369.
159 Id at 370.
160 Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1784 (1992).
161 Id. at 1806-07 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
162 Id. n.14 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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was procedural and not substantive.163 The majority used Jones to
establish that Foucha could no longer be held "in a psychiatric facil-
ity as an insanity acquittee."'r' 4 Justice White went on to require
"constitutionally adequate procedures" if Louisiana were to hold
Foucha any longer. 165 It is evident, then, that the majority's reliance
onJones justified Foucha's release from a mental hospital, but not his
release entirely. This interpretation of Jones could therefore permit
confinement under certain circumstances, thus reconciling the ma-
jority and the concurrence, and leaving the State's power of preven-
tive detention largely intact.
This reading of Jones, however, though consistent with both
opinions, is unpersuasive as the primary foundation for the Court's
decision in Foucha. Nothing in the language ofJones suggests such a
narrow interpretation. The Jones Court's repeated statements that
an acquittee's confinement "rests on his continuing illness and danger-
ousness"' 66 suggest that the acquittee's confinement depends upon a
finding of both mental illness and dangerousness. Furthermore, the
Court's references to release upon recovery indicate that the acquit-
tee may be confined only as long as he remains mentally ill.167
This is not to say that Justice Thomas' claim that Jones did not
reach any question on the standard for release of insanity acquittees
is any more convincing. As the majority in Foucha stated, the ques-
tion in Jones was whether an insanity acquittee was entitled to release
because his hospitalization exceeded the length of his hypothetical
criminal sentence.' 68 In rejecting the argument, the Jones Court
twice announced the outside limits on the detention of insanity ac-
quittees' 69 -that the detainee could be held until he had regained
his sanity or was no longer dangerous. 170 Though he cited the
proposition twice in his criticism of the majority, Justice Thomas
failed to address the question of why, underJones, Foucha was not
entitled to release upon regaining his sanity.
17'
163 Id. at 1784. The majority's substantive due process analysis does not begin until
several paragraphs later in the opinion.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 1785 (emphasis added).
166 Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 369 (1983) (emphasis added).
167 Id. Indeed, the Court stated as an example that under the District of Columbia
statute in question, no matter how serious the criminal act committed by the acquittee,
he would be entitled to release within "50 days of his acquittal if he [had] recovered." IL
(emphasis added).
168 Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1784 n.5 (1992).
169 Ironically, this statement undercuts the majority's own holding that insanity ac-
quitees can be detained after they have regained their sanity.
170 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1784 n.5 See also Jones, 463 U.S. at 368.
171 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1806-07 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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B. DUE PROCESS AND THE PROBLEM OF THE DISSENTS
The majority was clearly correct in holding, as a matter of pro-
cedural due process, that Foucha was entitled to release from the
psychiatric hospital once he had recovered from his mental illness.
Due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment
bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which an individ-
ual is committed.1 72 Hence, even if the acquittee's original confine-
ment were initially permissible, it could not constitutionally
continue if the basis for such confinement no longer existed.1 78
The primary purpose for Foucha's commitment to a psychiatric
institution was the treatment of his mental illness. Once he recov-
ered, the basis for his commitment disappeared and he was there-
fore entitled to release from the facility. To be sure, the State's
purpose in incapacitating dangerous individuals was also served by
such confinement.' 74 It is absurd to suggest, however, that an indi-
vidual who is not mentally ill should be committed to a mental insti-
tution, despite the fact that he may be dangerous. Indeed, the
heightened burden of clear and convincing evidence required both
for civil commitment and the institutionalization of convicted
criminals reflects the Court's desire to prevent the erroneous com-
mitment of those who are not mentally ill. 175 Yet, despite testimony
that no psychiatric benefit would be gained by continued confine-
ment,176 the dissenters would permit Foucha's detention at Felici-
ana for the simple reason that he is already there. This falls far
short of the due process "reasonableness" requirement stated in
Jackson.17
7
Both Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas criticized the major-
ity's reliance on Vitek v. Jones as inapplicable.178 In Vitek, the Court
struck down a Nebraska statute which provided for the transfer of
convicted prisoners suffering from a mental disorder to a psychiatric
hospital without the procedural safeguards of civil commitment. 179
The Court recognized the liberty interest of the prisoner in avoiding
172 Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) (State could institutionalize deaf
mute only long enough to determine whether he could be cured and become competent
to stand trial).
173 O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (holding that due process pre-
vents the confinement of a harmless mentally ill person).
174 See Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1808 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
175 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); Vitek v.Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1979).
176 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 35, at 7.
177 SeeJackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
178 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1796 (1992) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Id. at 1803 (Thomas,J.,
dissenting).
179 Vitek, 445 U.S. at 493.
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commitment to a mental facility without adequate proof that he was
mentally ill, despite the fact that he was already incarcerated.180
The dissents argued that the Court's concern in Vitek was over
the stigmatizing consequences of commitment which would warrant
the heightened procedural protection. 81 Tracking what Justice
Brennan called "the Court's most cynical argument" in Jones, 8 2
both Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas stated that "a criminal
defendant who successfully raises the insanity defense necessarily is
stigmatized by the verdict itself."' 83 Thus, the acquittee's actual
commitment to a mental institution adds little to the stigma of hav-
ing been found NGRI.' 8 4 Furthermore, since Foucha had not chal-
lenged any specific conditions of confinement (i.e., being forced to
share a cell with an insane person or being involuntarily treated
once he has regained his mental health), the Court could not con-
clude that his confinement in a mental facility was a per se violation
of the Due Process Clause.' 85
The dissents' analyses, however, failed to recognize that the
loss of liberty resulting from involuntary commitment is not just a
loss of freedom from confinement.' 8 6 Indeed, one commentator at-
tacked the dissents' reasoning as a callous disregard of the immedi-
ate deprivations associated with unnecessary hospitalization.' 8 7 In
Youngberg v. Romeo, 188 threeJustices acknowledged that long periods
of hospitalization, which foster dependence on an institutional envi-
ronment, can result in a loss of basic living skills and self-reliance.' 8 9
More importantly, because a mental hospital can be "replete with
brutality, random violence, noise, filth, and neglect,"' 190 unneces-
sary confinement should be avoided at all costs. Because Foucha
gained no therapeutic benefit from his continued confinement in a
psychiatric institution, and because the risks of unnecessary hospi-
180 Id.
181 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1796 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Id. at 1803 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
182 463 U.S. at 384 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
183 Id. at 367 n.16.
184 Id.
185 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1796 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Id. at 1809 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
186 Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492 (1980). The Court cited the stigmatizing social
consequences of commitment and the mandatory behavior modification programs to
which the committee was subjected as further infringements upon the prisoner's liberty.
187 Margulies, supra note 141, at 821.
188 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
189 Id. at 327-29 (Blackmun, J., concurring, joined by Brennan and O'Connor, JJ.).
190 Margulies, supra note 141, at 821-22.
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talization were outweighed by Foucha's liberty interest, he was enti-
tled to release from Feliciana.
Having established that Foucha cannot be confined in a mental
facility, the Court turned to the question of whether Foucha may be
confined at all. The majority stated that once an insanity acquittee
has regained his sanity and cannot be held as such in a mental hospi-
tal, he is entitled to "constitutionally adequate procedures" to es-
tablish the grounds for his continued confinement.191 This
profoundly ambiguous statement begged the question of what pro-
cedures, if any, the Court would consider "constitutionally ade-
quate" to allow a state to hold a sane insanity acquittee.
Citing Jackson v. Indiana,192 Justice White alluded to "the pro-
tections constitutionally required in a civil commitment proceed-
ing." 193 He failed to articulate, however, which protections (i.e.,
availability and frequency of release hearings, judicial review of such
hearings, allocation of and standards for burdens of proof, etc.)
Louisiana failed to provide. 194 More troublesome, however, was the
Court's reading of Jackson itself. In Jackson, the Court held that a
state can institutionalize a person who is incompetent to stand trial
only long enough to determine whether there is a substantial
probability that he will attain the capacity to stand trial in the fore-
seeable future. 195 If not, the State must either commit him in a civil
proceeding or release him. 196
The majority in Foucha tracked this argument in determining
whether Foucha could be held in a mental institution, stating that
"[K]eeping Foucha against his will in a mental institution is im-
proper absent a determination in civil commitment proceedings of
current mental illness and dangerousness."' 197 The Court's full dis-
cussion of Jackson, however, came after the Court had determined
that Foucha was entitled to release from the mental hospital, indi-
cating that the Court must have appliedJackson to confinement apart
from a psychiatric facility. 198 Justice White's reference to "constitu-
tionally adequate procedures" thus divorced the constitutional pro-
191 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1785 (citingJackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972)). See also
Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
192 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
193 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1785. See also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
194 Indeed, as Justice Thomas indicated in his dissent, the majority did not purport to
examine the procedures provided by Louisiana for the release of insanity acquitees.
Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1800 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
195 Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738.
196 d 
197 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1784.
198 Id. at 1785.
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tections of civil commitment from the commitment process itself,
without explanation (by either the majority or the dissenters) as to
which procedural protections were under consideration.
One possibility is the State's allocation of the burdens of proof
in commitment proceedings. As discussed above, in order for an
individual to be civilly committed, the State bears the burden of
proving insanity and dangerousness by clear and convincing evi-
dence. 199 The Louisiana release procedures under consideration in
Foucha, by contrast, placed the burden on the acquittee to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that he would not pose a danger to
himself or to the community. 200 Justice White's "constitutionally
adequate procedures," then, would require the State to prove dan-
gerousness by clear and convincing evidence in order to confine the
acquittee at all.
The problem in requiring an insanity acquittee to establish his
non-dangerousness rests on the fact that the acquittee has already
been proven to have committed a crime: "[O]nce a man has shown
himself to be dangerous, it is all but impossible for him to prove the
negative that he is no longer a menace."'20 1 The societal instinct to
punish those who have committed crimes-despite the statutory
prohibition-may also prejudice the factfinder against the acquit-
tee.2 0 2 In addition, as one commentator has noted, the fear that an
acquittee will commit other crimes in the future is reflected in the
unwillingness of psychiatrists to make predictions as to an individ-
ual's non-dangerousness.203 By placing the burden of proof on the
State, the Court would thus spare the acquittee the Sisyphean bur-
den of proving the negative.
In his dissent, Justice Kennedy accused the Court of ignoring
the criminal nature of the proceedings and conflating the standards
for civil and criminal commitment-in effect, overruling Jones -by
requiring the same procedural protections for sane insanity acquit-
tees as for civil committees. 20 4 The Jones Court rejected the conten-
tion that the government had to meet the standards for civil
commitment prior to incarcerating an insanity acquittee after adju-
dication, permitting his automatic incarceration on the basis of the
NGRI verdict, where insanity was established by a preponderance of
199 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426-27 (1979).
200 LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 657 (West Supp. 1991).
201 Margulies, supra note 141, at 833 (citing Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 629
(D.C. Cir. 1969)).
202 Id. at 823.
203 Id.
204 Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1793 (1992) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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the evidence. 20 5 In Justice Kennedy's view, the majority in Foucha
erred by ignoring Jones' acceptance of lower standards for criminal
commitment. 206
Justice Thomas drew onJones as well. He argued thatJones rec-
ognized a real and legitimate distinction between insanity acquittees
and civil committees that justified a procedural disparity-the fact
that insanity acquittees had been found to have committed a crimi-
nal act.20 7 Justice Thomas went on to state that "[w]hile a state may
renounce a punitive interest by offering an insanity defense, it does
not follow that, once the acquittee's sanity is 'restored,' the State is
required to ignore his criminal act, and to renounce all interest in
protecting society from him."' 20 8
As Justice Thomas himself recognized, however, theJnes Court
addressed only the procedural differences in initial commitment
proceedings, not the disparity in the standards for release.20 9 Jones
permitted the use of an acquittee's prior criminal act as evidence of
his continuing mental illness and dangerousness, thus justifying a
lower standard of proof at commitment. The criminal act's proba-
tive value, however, decreases over time.210 Although Louisiana has
determined that an inference of dangerousness drawn from an in-
sanity verdict will continue even after the acquittee has regained his
sanity, and such determination warrants judicial deference, 21' it can-
not be said that the inference may continue indefinitely. Eventually,
the connection between the acquittee's prior criminal act and future
predictions of dangerousness will be too tenuous to sustain any pro-
cedural differences between an acquittee and a civil committee. 21 2
The obvious question, then, is when this procedural conver-
gence should occur. One commentator suggested that the hypo-
thetical criminal sentence should serve as the guide by which the
205 Il (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 366
(1983)).
206 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
207 Id. at 1800 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See also Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354,
367 (1983).
208 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1801 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
2 0 9 Jones, 463 U.S. at 363 n.l1.
210 Stephen Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity Defense Reconsidered, 58 S. CAL. L.
REv. 777, 831 (1985). See also Note, Rules for an Exceptional Class: The Commitment and
Release of Persons Acquitted of Violent Offenses by Reason of Insanity, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 281, 326
(1982) (hereinafter Note).
211 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1789. Relying onJones, the Court stated that the uncertainty
of medical knowledge regarding mental disease warrants that courts pay particular def-
erence to reasonable legislative judgments about the relationship between dangerous
behavior and mental illness. Id.
212 Morse, supra note 210, at 835; Note, supra note 210, at 326-27.
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acquittee's rights reach parity with the civil committee.213 Another
argued that since prison sentences are based on punitive rather than
dangerousness concerns, the appropriate length of time can only be
met by a reasonableness standard.2 14 Yet in both cases, the danger-
ousness under consideration was a result of the acquittee's continu-
ing mental illness; indeed, both commentators acknowledged that,
absent a mental health reason for hospitalization, the acquittee was
entitled to release.2 15 In order to hold the acquittee longer, as in
Jackson, the State would be required to afford the protections of civil
commitment. 2 16
After establishing the procedures by which a State could con-
fine a sane acquittee, Justice White's analysis turned to the question
of whether the acquittee's continued confinement would violate sub-
stantive due process. The Court began its discussion by emphasiz-
ing that "commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant
deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection." 21 7
While a state may incarcerate convicted criminals for the purposes
of deterrence and retribution, no such punitive interest existed
here, since Foucha was exempt from criminal responsibility.2 1 8
Likewise, although a state may confine a person upon proof by clear
and convincing evidence of mental illness and dangerousness, this
did not apply, since Foucha was not insane.2 19
Justice White then acknowledged that, in certain narrow cir-
cumstances, a state may confine an individual who poses a danger to
others or to the community. 220 In United States v. Salerno,221 the case
on which the State placed its primary reliance, the Court addressed
the question of pretrial detention. The Court upheld the Bail Re-
form Act's authorization of confinement on the basis of dangerous-
ness as a carefully limited exception to the Due Process Clause
because of its narrow scope.222 The circumstances under which de-
tention could be sought were limited to only the most serious felo-
nies;223 and the scheme addressed an acute problem involving
overwhelming government interests. 224 Under the Act, the detainee
213 Note, supra note 210, at 327.
214 Morse, supra note 210, at 835.
215 Id.
216 Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1785 (1992).
217 Id. at 1785 (citingJones, 463 U.S. at 361 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
218 L .REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:14 (West 1986).
219 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1786.
220 Id.
221 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
222 Id. at 747.
223 Id. at 750.
224 Id.
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was also entitled to an adversary hearing at which the government
had to prove dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence.22 5
Finally, the Act strictly limited the length of the detainee's
confinement. 226
Justice White rejected the State's analogy to Salerno. He argued
that, unlike the Bail Reform Act, the Louisiana statute was over-
broad, treating all insanity acquittees alike regardless of the
charge. 227 Furthermore, the statute failed to provide for an adver-
sary hearing at which the State bore the burden, by clear and con-
vincing evidence, on the issue of dangerousness. 228 In her
concurrence, Justice O'Connor suggested that Louisiana could pro-
vide for the confinement of sane insanity acquittees if "the nature
and duration of detention were tailored to reflect pressing public
safety concerns related to the acquittee's continuing dangerous-
ness." 229 Because the current scheme was not so tailored, it could
not defeat Foucha's liberty interest. 230
The fatal flaw in the majority's analysis is evident here. Jones
established that the acquittee's hypothetical criminal sentence
should neither be used as a ceiling on the length of the acquittee's
commitment, nor as a floor by which to hold an acquittee longer
than his mental illness requires. In focusing on the limited scheme
of confinement in Salerno, the Court failed to acknowledge that the
length of the acquittee's confinement is determined by his mental
illness alone. Instead, as Justice O'Connor made dear, the Court
paved the way for states to craft another exception to an acquittee's
liberty interest-the states must simply be more careful in doing so.
Both dissenters took issue with the extent of the liberty interest
of an insanity acquittee. Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas em-
phasized that a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity differs dra-
matically from a verdict of not guilty simpliciter.23l As Justice
Kennedy argued, in a criminal case, the question of insanity will be
addressed only after each element of the crime has been proven be-
yond a reasonable doubt.23 2 Though an individual is entitled to
heightened due process scrutiny before adjudication, once a state
has met its burden, it may confine the person on any reasonable
225 Id at 751.
226 Id. at 747.
227 Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1786 (1992).
228 Id
229 Id. at 1789 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
230 Id. at 1786.
231 Id at 1793 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Id. at 1805-06 n.3 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
232 Id. at 1791 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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basis. 233 Thus, the dissent argued that the acquittee's interest was
not so great as to warrant heightened scrutiny.23 4 In addition, Jones
held that the insanity acquittal itself was sufficient to warrant a lower
standard of proof, and thus a lower level of due process protection,
at commitment. 23 5
Justice Thomas, on the other hand, attacked the Court for ig-
noring the well-established analytical framework for evaluating sub-
stantive due process claims. 23 6 Except in the case where a
fundamental right is infringed (triggering strict scrutiny and requir-
ing a compelling State interest and narrow tailoring), judicial scru-
tiny of the substance of state legislation under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not exacting.23 7 Because
many states have long provided for the continued institutionaliza-
tion of insanity acquittees on the basis of dangerousness, 238 and be-
cause the Court has never applied strict scrutiny to laws involving
involuntary confinement of the mentally ill or insanity acquittees, 23 9
Justice Thomas considered Justice O'Connor's heightened level of
scrutiny240 both unwarranted and unsupportable.
24'
A more stringent judicial standard is appropriate in reviewing
legislation in the criminal commitment context, however, for several
reasons. First, there is a strong likelihood that legislative classifica-
tions are not based solely on the purposes of treatment and public
protection. 242 Instead, legislators may be motivated by the desire to
punish the acquittee for the crime he has committed, contrary to the
holding ofJones and to the fundamental basis of the insanity defense
233 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
234 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
235 Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 367 (1983).
236 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1804 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
237 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-96
(1986)).
238 Id. at 1806 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing HENRY WEIHOFEN, INSANITY AS A DE-
FENSE IN CRIMINAL LAw 294-332 (1933); ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE
148-49 (1967)).
239 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas acknowledged that the standard of
review in cases involving insanity acquittees has not yet been settled. He noted, how-
ever, that, at most a "reasonable relation" standard applies, indicating a highly deferen-
tial judicial scrutiny. Since he considered the Louisiana scheme at the very least
reasonable, there was no need for the Court to determine which standard of review was
appropriate. Id. at 1807 n.15.
240 Justice O'Connor's standard ofjudicial review reflects an intermediate standard of
scrutiny. Intermediate scrutiny, established in the equal protection context for cases
involving classifications based on gender, requires that the legislation be "substantially
related" (vs. necessary) to "important" (vs. compelling) government objectives. Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
241 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1807 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
242 Margulies, supra note 141, at 815.
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itself.243 Indeed, the dissents' focus on Foucha's criminal act seems
to reflect this desire to hold Foucha accountable for his crime, de-
spite the fact that he has been exempted from criminal responsibility
by the State.
In addition, the lack of political power of insanity acquittees fur-
therjustifies the need for heightened scrutiny.244 A person's status
as an insanity acquittee creates "a special condition, which tends se-
riously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily
to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry. '245
Finally, heightened scrutiny is appropriate because of the ac-
quittee's fundamental right to liberty. Though the dissents chided
the majority for attaching talismanic significance to the fact that
Foucha had not been convicted,246 they failed to acknowledge the
fundamental differences between a NGRI verdict and a verdict of
guilty but mentally ill (GBMI). Louisiana law provides that "[i]f the
circumstances indicate that because of a mental disease or mental
defect the offender was incapable of distinguishing between right
and wrong with reference to the conduct in question, the offender
shall be exempt from criminal responsibility. ' 247 A state recogniz-
ing the GBMI verdict, however, does not relieve the offender from
criminal responsibility for his conduct.
248
An insanity acquittal thus demonstrates the intent of the state
legislature to preclude criminal responsibility for the acquittee's
conduct-and, as required by Jones, a recognition that the acquit-
tee's detention will not be determined by a criminal sentence. Had
Foucha been found GBMI, there would have been no question as to
whether or not the State had to release him once he regained his
sanity; if time had remained on his sentence, he would have been
transferred to a prison.
Thus, it was only because Foucha was acquitted that the issue of
his continued confinement arose at all. Once Foucha regained his
sanity, underJones, his liberty interest was restored; since liberty is a
243 Id.
244 Id. at 816.
245 Id. at 816 n.141 (citing United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-
53 n.4 (1938)). But see Benham v. Edwards, 678 F.2d 511, 515-16 n.9 (5th Cir. 1982)
(holding that insanity acquittees are no more of a suspect class than women, aliens, or
illegitimate children-all classes that have been denied strict scrutiny), cited in Polstein,
supra note 5, at 487-88 n.55.
246 Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1793 (1992) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Id. at
1805-06 n.13 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
247 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:14 (West 1986).
248 See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 6-2(c)(1989).
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fundamental right, strict scrutiny should have applied. Hence, the
problem with Justice O'Connor's standard of scrutinym-and the ma-
jority's holding-was that they did not go far enough to ensure the
protection of the acquittee's liberty interest.
C. EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE ERROR OF THE MAJORITY
The majority's equal protection analysis reflects the weakness
of the Court's analysis as well. Justice O'Connor understandably
did not join the opinion on equal protection-for if she had, she
would have fallen into the same contradiction that plagued the re-
maining four Justices of the majority: arguing both that the State
must release insanity acquittees upon regaining their sanity and that
the State may, by assuming the burden of proof by clear and con-
vincing evidence, detain them on the basis of dangerousness alone.
The thrust of the Court's equal protection argument was sim-
ple: since Louisiana did not provide for the similar confinement of
other classes of persons who have committed crimes but who may
still be dangerous (such as convicted criminals who have served
their time), it impermissibly discriminated against sane insanity ac-
quittees by detaining them on the grounds of their continuing dan-
gerousness. 249 The Court went on to say, however, that because the
State did not provide the same procedures (i.e., proof by the State
of insanity and dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence) for
the continued commitment of insanity acquittees as it did for civil
committees and insane convicts at the end of their prison terms, it
could not confine Foucha. This implies that, by assuming this bur-
den of proof, further confinement would be acceptable. 250
The contradiction here is evident. As Justice Thomas argued
earlier, it is disingenuous to argue that an acquittee who is no
longer insane can somehow be confined longer by requiring a
heightened standard of proof of insanity. If, however, the Court is
suggesting that the State need only prove dangerousness by clear
and convincing evidence to confine the acquittee (as it did in the
majority opinion), it has run aground of its first argument. Con-
victed criminals are released at the end of their sentences, regard-
less of their potential dangerousness. 25 1 As Jones held, in the
249 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1788.
250 Id. at 1788-89.
251 Justice Kennedy noted in his dissent that parole release provisions often use dan-
gerousness as a criterion for release, placing the burden of proof on the prisoner to
prove his lack of dangerousness. Id. at 1796. His dissent, however, failed to recognize
that the decision to parole is discretionary; a state need not grant parole at all. See
Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. I
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context of insanity acquittals, the length of an acquittee's confine-
ment "rests on his continuing illness and dangerousness." 252
Therefore, to treat the sane acquittee the same as a convicted crimi-
nal, the State was required to release him once the basis for his con-
finement no longer applied.
Justice Thomas' rejection of the Court's equal protection argu-
ment fared no better. His dissent, like Justice Kennedy's, focused
primarily on the comparison between insanity acquittees and civil
committees.253 He argued that the majority erroneously equated
civil committees with insanity acquittees once the latter had
regained their sanity, and criticized the Court for ignoring the fact
that the acquittees had been proven to have committed a crime.2 54
Justice Thomas' dissent, however, ignored the fact that many
civil committees have engaged in conduct that is equally as danger-
ous as that of an insanity acquittee. 255 Furthermore, the fact that a
person is civilly committed rather than found NGRI may in some
cases mean that the prosecutor, at his or her discretion, decided not
to bring a criminal action, or that the person charged with the of-
fense was found unfit to stand trial. 256 More importantly, Justice
Thomas never addressed the comparison between insanity acquit-
tees and convicted criminals detained past the length of their sen-
tence. Though he spent a great deal of time focusing on the
acquittee's criminal act, he failed to offer any explanation why
others found to have committed crimes could not be held on the
basis of dangerousness alone.
D. FOUCHA AND THE FUTURE
The implications of Foucha on future cases is as unclear as its
holding. On the one hand, Justice O'Connor's concurrence seems
to demonstrate that a state wanting to confine insanity acquittees on
the basis of their continuing dangerousness may do so if the statute
is carefully crafted to meet her heightened standard ofjudicial scru-
(1979). The state has the power to hold a prisoner for the full length of his sentence in
the interests of incapacitative incarceration. Indeed, "[t]here is no constitutional or in-
herent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a
valid sentence." Id. at 7. Once the prisoner has served his time, however, he must be
released, dangerous or not.
252 Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 369 (1983).
253 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1800 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
254 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
255 Donald HJ. Hermann & Yvonne S. Sor, Convicting or Confining? Alternative Directions
in Insanity Law Reform: Guilty But Mentally Ill Versus New Rules for Release of Insanity Acquitees,




tiny. What is problematic, however, is that such a statute may have
little practical impact. The fear of recidivism of insanity acquittees
that prompted the legislation may translate into a greater willing-
ness by psychiatrists to consider the person mentally ill because of
his continuing dangerousness, even though he may have clinically
regained his sanity. 257
Yet two lower courts, in states currently providing for the con-
tinued confinement of insanity acquittees, have rejected Justice
O'Connor's interpretation of the Court's decision. In Louisiana v.
Boudreaux,258 the Louisiana Supreme Court vacated and remanded
Boudreaux's conviction to the trial court for consideration of the
"constitutional principles made clear by Foucha."259 These princi-
ples, as seen by the Louisiana court, provided that an insanity ac-
quittee is entitled to release when he has recovered his sanity or is
no longer dangerous, and that the state may continue confinement
only if it shows by clear and convincing evidence that the acquittee
is both mentally ill and dangerous. 260 Similarly, in In re Noel,261 the
Kansas Appellate Court remanded the case, requiring the State to
prove insanity and dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence
in order to justify Noel's continued commitment.2 62
Lower courts and future decisions may well resolve the conflicts
of Foucha in favor of the insanity acquittee, as evidenced above. Fur-
thermore, at the time of the Foucha decision, only eleven states had
any provisions for continued confinement based on dangerousness
alone.263 Of those, however, two have been amended to release in-
sanity acquittees who have regained their sanity, regardless of dan-
gerousness. 264 Even so, with an ambiguous holding seemingly
molded by public fear than by the Constitution, the precedent of
Foucha remains a dangerous one for the future.
257 Margulies, supra note 141, at 825 n. 183. Indeed, it seems counterintuitive to argue
that a person, after proof by clear and convincing evidence that there is a substantial risk
that he will inflict physical harm upon another person in the near future, is not somehow
mentally ill.
258 605 So. 2d 608 (La. 1992).
259 Id.
260 Id.
261 838 P.2d 336 (Kan. App 1992).
262 Id. at 345.
263 Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1802-03 n.9 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
The statutes cited by Justice Thomas are listed supra note 117.
264 Id. at 1790 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor cited CAL. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 1026.2 (West Supp. 1992) (effective Jan. 1, 1994) and VA. CODE § 19.2-182.5
(Supp. 1991) (effectiveJuly 1, 1992).
976 [Vol. 83
1993] CONFINEMENT OF INSANITY ACQUITTEES
V1. CONCLUSION
The release of insanity acquittees and the surrounding contro-
versy reflects what is at the heart of the debate about the insanity
defense itself: whether we, as a society, believe in the moral culpa-
bility of the mentally ill. From its inception, the insanity defense
spurred public outrage:
Ye people of England: exult and be glad,
For ye're now at the will of the merciless mad.
Why say ye that but three authorities reign-
Crown, Commons, and Lords!-You omit the insane!
They're a privileg'd class, whom no statute controls,
And their murderous charter exists in their souls.
Do they wish to spill blood-they have only to play
A few pranks-get asylum'd a month and a day
-They heigh! to escape from the mad-doctor's keys,
And to pistol or stab whomsoever they please.265
Public fears about the premature release of those found NGRI and
doubts about medical science's ability to determine whether a per-
son really is sane lead courts to err on the side of caution in their
decisions to approve the release of acquittees.
Yet, once an acquittee has regained his sanity, it is the Constitu-
tion which mandates his release. While it is inevitable that psychia-
trists will make mistakes, and likely that a number of insanity
acquittees will commit future crimes, our system does not criminally
confine based on what may happen in the future. As long as there
remains an insanity defense which acquits the defendant and ex-
empts him from criminal responsibility, the acquittee's illness will
determine the length of his sentence. And once he has been cured,
he must, in the interests of liberty, be released.
ELLEN M. PAPADAKIS
265 Thomas Campbell, Congratulations on a Late Acquittal, STANDARD, Mar. 7, 1843, at 1,
cited in Hermann & Sor, supra note 255, at 500.
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